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Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by Thomas D. Church*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
continued its efforts to untangle the complex web of laws known as the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.' The year saw a number of precedential
decisions interpreting its provisions, including those governing specific
offenses such as drug trafficking and fraud, as well as those setting forth
the proper methodology for establishing a defendant's criminal history.
This Survey identifies and summarizes the important holdings from
these decisions. Section II begins with the decisions reviewing an
application of the Guidelines provisions for specific offenses, and the
different enhancements available for certain classes of crimes. Section III
then focuses on the general adjustments that apply irrespective of the
specific offense type, such as those based on a defendant's role in an
offense or the number of victims in an offense. Finally, Section IV
addresses cases involving the proper determination of a defendant's
criminal history category. As our justice system continues striving for
fairness in sentencing, it is important to take note of the changes in the
Guidelines, which, though advisory, are at minimum a crucial starting
point for judges endeavoring to impose just sentences.
II. SPECIFIC TYPES OF OFFENSES
A. Basic Economic Offenses
The Guidelines for sentencing defendants convicted of basic economic
offenses such as fraud, theft, and bribery are found in Chapter Two, Part
B.2 In 2016, almost 25% of offenders sentenced in the Eleventh Circuit
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1. U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINEs MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
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were sentenced for fraud, larceny, or other white-collar crimes. 3 It should
come as no surprise, then, that the Eleventh Circuit addressed several
Guideline provisions governing these types of crimes in 2017.
1. Calculating Actual and Intended Loss Amounts under USSG
§ 2B1.1
In offenses involving fraud, larceny, or embezzlement, the amount of
money a defendant actually deprives or intends to deprive a victim of is
often the most important factor in properly calculating a defendant's
offense level. United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 2B1.1(b)(1)4
provides a table featuring several ranges for the 'loss amount" of an
amount, and each range corresponds to an increase in the defendant's
offense level.5 While it is uncontroversial that a defendant who steals one
million dollars should be sentenced more harshly than one who steals a
hundred, issues arise when defendants claim they did not cause a
particular loss or that they were unaware of losses caused by their codefendants.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed these kinds of issues in 2017. In
United States v. Castaneda-Pozo,6 for example, a defendant convicted of
bank fraud argued that he should not be held "accountable for the
scheme's entire intended loss amount," which included losses
attributable to his co-conspirators. 7 In the scheme, the co-conspirators
drove rental cars through apartment complexes and stole residents' rent
checks out of mailboxes, which the defendant would then deposit. At
sentencing, the defendant argued that the losses stemming from his coconspirators' actions should not be held against him because he was
unaware of what his co-conspirators did with the cars, and he was
unaware that the checks he deposited were stolen.8
The Eleventh Circuit rejected his argument, restating the law that
"[w]hen an offense involves jointly undertaken criminal activity, relevant
conduct includes all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others
in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity."9 At trial, the
defendant's co-conspirators testified that the defendant was the
3. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL
YEAR 2016, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FIGURE A 1 (2016).
4.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

2016).
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
COMM'N 2016).
6. 877 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2017).
7. Id. at 1251-52.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1251.

§

2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

§§

2B1.1(b)(1)(A)-(P) (U.S. SENTENCING
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"ringleader of the scheme," and had rented the cars for them. 10
Accordingly, he was held accountable for those foreseeable losses.'1
While calculating the loss amount in Castaneda-Pozo was relatively
straightforward, figuring out the loss amount in United States v. Wrightl2
was decidedly trickier. In Wright, the defendant challenged the district
court's finding that the defendant was responsible for $7.7 million in
intended losses by virtue of a "special rule" that counts a defendant's
unlawful possession of personally identifiable information (PII) towards
the total intended loss amount.13
In Wright, the defendant filed over 700 fraudulent tax returns,
accounting for more than $800,000 of the total loss amount. 14 The issue
was whether the defendant's unlawful possession of PII of over 13,811
people, including credit and debit card numbers, social security numbers,
and other unspecified forms of PII could count towards the rest of the loss
amount.1 5 Under the "Special Rules" of § 2B1.1, any charge a defendant
makes with a counterfeit or unauthorized "access device," such as a credit
card or personal identification number, is counted towards the
defendant's total loss amount, and even if an access device is never used,
its mere possession by a defendant is factored into the intended loss
amount for "at least $500 per access device."' 6
The ultimate issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Wright was whether
the P11, or "compromised identities," in the defendant's possession
constituted counterfeit or unauthorized access devices, and thus,
whether the government could prove the intended loss beyond the
$800,000 in fraudulent tax returns.' 7 Of the 13,811 "identities" in the
defendant's possession, the court noted there were 331 debit or credit
cards, which the Eleventh Circuit previously deemed qualify as "access
devices."' 8 Each of these cards thus contributed $500 to the total loss
amount. 19

But perhaps the most important part of the opinion was the court's
inquiry into whether the "numerous" social security numbers in the
10. Id. at 1251-52.
11. Id. at 1252.
12. 862 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2017).
13. Id. at 1270-71.
14. Id. at 1274.
15. Id. at 1274-75.
16. Id. at 1274.
17. Id. at 1274-75.
18. Id. at 1275. The court also cited numerous Eleventh Circuit opinions finding
usernames, passwords, routing and bank account numbers, and merchant account numbers
to be "access devices." Id.
19. Id.
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defendant's possession constituted unauthorized access devices. Noting
that it had never before decided the issue in a published opinion, and
crediting persuasive opinions from other circuits, the court officially held
that "a social security number qualifies as an 'access device' under the
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) 20 and for purposes of applying the
Special Rules in the Sentencing Guidelines." 2 1
Even though the social security numbers in the defendant's possession
could be counted towards the total loss amount, the court nonetheless
vacated the defendant's sentence for the following reasons: (1) there was
no specific quantity of social security numbers alleged, and thus no way
to calculate them towards the loss amount under the Special Rules; and
(2) the government had not shown that the rest of the PII included
personal identification numbers or other types of access devices. 22 Since
the court could not readily determine how many social security cards to
count towards the loss amount or the contents of the remaining P11, only
the fraudulent tax returns and the credit and debit card numbers in the
defendant's possession could be counted towards the total intended loss
amount, which fell below the "over $3,500,000" range attributed to the
defendant at sentencing. 23
In addition to the intended loss amount, the Eleventh Circuit took up
an important case regarding how to properly calculate the actual loss

amount in fraud offenses. In United States v. Stein,24 the defendant, a
lawyer, was convicted of securities fraud after he "fabricated press
releases and purchase orders to inflate the stock price of his client
Signalife, Inc." 25 The court vacated the defendant's sentence, however,
because the government failed to prove the losses suffered by Signalife's
investors were actually or legally caused by the defendant's conduct. 26
Since the government did not try to establish an intended loss amount,
it had the burden of proving the "actual loss attributable to the
defendant's conduct" by a preponderance of the evidence. 27 While this
calculation does not have to be specific and individualized for each victim,
a court's estimate of an actual loss amount must be "based 'on reliable

20. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) (2018).
21. Wright, 862 F.3d at 1275.
22. Id. at 1276.
23. Id.
24. 846 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2017).
25. Id. at 1139.
26. Id. at 1154. The government did not try to argue an intended loss amount. Id. at
1153-54.
27. Id. at 1152.
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and specific evidence' rather than mere speculation." 28 In Stein, that
meant the government had to prove that "in deciding to purchase
Signalife stock, investors relied on the fraudulent information Mr. Stein
disseminated." 29
Specifically, the government had to prove that the defendant's fraud
was both the "but for" and the "proximate" cause of the investor's putative
losses. 30 In determining whether the defendant's offense was the "but for"
cause of the investors' pecuniary losses, the court stated that the
government could prove "but for" causation by either introducing "direct
evidence that each individual investor read the false information and
relied on it when deciding to purchase stock" or by offering "specific
circumstantial evidence . . . that all of the investors relied on the

defendant's fraudulent information." 31 In Stein, the government failed to
provide either. 32
At sentencing, the government tried to prove that all 2,415 investors
who purchased Signalife stock during the time of the defendant's offense
did so in reliance on the defendant's fraudulent representations. 33 The
government's evidence included testimony from one investor who relied
on one of the defendant's press releases, a victim's statement at
sentencing to the same effect, other victim statements suggesting
reliance on general press releases and publicly available information,
and an inference that some investors relied on the defendant's
misrepresentations because "the only place to get information about
Signalife stock was from press releases and public filings." 34 Not only was
this evidence insufficient to assume reliance by every investor, the court
held, but it was "the kind of speculation forbidden by the Sentencing
Guidelines." 35
The court also held that the government had failed to prove that the
defendant's fraud was the proximate or legal cause of the investors'
losses.

36

This required proving that it was "reasonably foreseeable" that

investors would lose money due to the defendant's fraud rather than
37
The
"intervening events that may have affected the stock price."

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1156.
1140.
1152-53.
1153-54.
1154.

1155-56.
1156.
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defendant argued that he could not reasonably foresee the degree of loss
investors would suffer because their losses were also caused by an
intervening event, namely "the short selling of over 22 million shares of
Signalife stock and the across-the-board stock market decline of 2008."38
The court held that, on remand, the district court should "approximate
the effect of such intervening events and subtract this amount from its
actual loss calculation." 39
2. Calculating the Improper Benefit Conferred under § 2B4.1
In addition to larceny and fraud, other Chapter Two, Part B offenses
refer to the loss amount table under § 2B1.1(b)(1) to calculate a
defendant's offense level. Section 2B4.1 of the USSG,4 0 which applies to
various types of bribery offenses, mandates that the "greater of the value
of the bribe or the improper benefit to be conferred" in a defendant's
offense corresponds to the loss amount ranges under § 2B4.1(b)(1).41
Accordingly, the greater the bribe or benefit received, the higher the
increase in the defendant's offense level.42
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Nerey, 43 like its
opinion in Castaneda-Pozo, clarified how to determine the extent of a
defendant's culpability for the amount of money in an offense involving
paying and receiving healthcare kickbacks. 44 In Nerey, the defendant
appealed a sixteen-level increase to his offense level under
§ 2B4.1(b)(1)(B), challenging the district court's finding that he was
responsible for the entire amount of improper benefits conferred on two
healthcare companies that were billing Medicare fraudulently for
patients the defendant and his co-conspirators recruited. 45
The defendant objected and argued that the amount used to calculate
his offense level should be limited to benefits conferred on him
personally, as he "was only one of many patient recruiters at Mercy HC
and D&D&D and that he was not involved in their actual submission of
fraudulent claims . . [and] that he did not agree to commit fraud with
any patients he did not recruit."4 6
38. Id. at 1155-56.
39. Id. at 1156.
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B4.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
41. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B4.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2016). The loss amount table from § 2B1.1 is only consulted if the bribe or benefit exceeds
$6500. Otherwise, a defendant's offense level is only increased by one level. Id.
42. Id.
43. 877 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 2017).
44. See generally id.
45. Id. at 977.
46. Id. at 977-78.
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In affirming the defendant's sentence, however, the court observed
that defendants are held accountable for all the conduct in a "jointly
undertaken criminal activity" that is "(1) within the scope of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity, (2) in furtherance of that criminal activity,
and (3) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity."47
The district court was justified in holding the defendant responsible
for the entire amount billed because the defendant had been the "top
source" of patients recruited for the scheme, as well as a recruiter for coconspirators that helped facilitate the two companies' fraudulent
billing. 48 The Eleventh Circuit also determined that the companies'
fraudulent billing was "in furtherance of the conspiracy," as "all of the
kickbacks to Nerey were made possible by the fraudulent Medicare
claims filed by various co-conspirators" at the two companies. 49 Lastly,
the court stated that it was "reasonably foreseeable" that the defendant's
co-conspirators would take the prescriptions, patients, and recruits
provided by the defendant "and use them in the scheme to file fraudulent
Medicare claims."50
3. Victim-Based Enhancements under § 2B1.1
In addition to the loss amount, a fraud offender's offense level can be
enhanced if the fraud "resulted in substantial financial hardship to five
or more victims."5

1

The application notes for USSG

§ 2B1.1(b)(2) provide

several factors to consider in determining this "substantiality," including
whether the victims became insolvent; filed for bankruptcy; suffered
losses in their retirement, savings, or investment funds; were forced to
make substantial changes to their employment or living arrangements;
and experienced an increased difficulty in obtaining credit. 52
The court's opinion in Castaneda-Pozowas noteworthy because it was
the first time the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the meaning of
"substantial financial hardship."5 3 First, the court looked to decisions in
other circuits for examples of such hardship, including cases where
working-class victims lost $2,000 that "would take years to recover" 54 and
47. Id. at 978.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016).
52. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

COMM'N 2016).
53. Castaneda-Pozo,877 F.3d at 1252.
54. Id.

§

2B1.1,

cmt.

4(F) (U.S. SENTENCING
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where victims had to move, lost their savings, and had to postpone
retirement.55
Citing that persuasive authority, the court affirmed the
enhancement's application in Castaneda-Pozo because stealing rent
checks from tenants when rent was due caused the tenants substantial
hardships.56 The court recited several facts from the record illustrating
these hardships: the victims had to repay their rent plus additional late
fees, some had to borrow money from friends and family, or at extremely
high interest rates, two fell behind on their bills, and two had to either
take on extra jobs or extra shifts.57 The court held that making victims
"insecure in life's basic necessities-housing, electricity, water, and
food ... is sufficient to raise a substantial hardship."5 8
In addition to defining "substantial financial hardship," the Eleventh
Circuit also looked at enhancements based on the number of victims in
an offense. While Chapter Three, Part A59 recites several "Victim-Related
Adjustments," there are certain victim-based enhancements exclusive to
economic offenses under Chapter Two, Part B.60 USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2), for
example, calls for various levels of enhancement if the fraud offense
"involved ten or more victims" or "resulted in substantial financial
61
hardship" to the victims.

In United States v. Tejas,62 the Eleventh Circuit narrowed the scope of
a "Special Rule" under § 2B1.1(b)(2), which mandates that offenses
involving '"United States Postal Service relay box, collection box, delivery
vehicle, satchel, or cart,' the offense 'shall be considered to have involved
at least 10 victims."' 63 The defendant, convicted of mail fraud after

shoving a mail carrier and taking a package from her delivery vehicle,
asserted that enhancement under the Special Rule was improper in his
case because it was undisputed that the offense involved only "one
specific package."6
On appeal, the court agreed, vacating the defendant's sentence
because application of the Special Rule in a case that undisputedly
involved only one piece of mail would be inconsistent with the "plain text
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 1252-53.
Id. at 1253.
Id.

59.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING

60.

COMM'N 2016).
61. Id.
62. 868 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2017).
63. Id. at 1245.
64. Id. at 1243-45.
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of the number-of-victims enhancement." 65 The court noted three policy
considerations underpinning the Special Rule, namely the unique
problems posed by proving offenses involving undelivered mail, the
difficulty in quantifying losses from undelivered mail, and "the
importance of maintaining the integrity of the United States mail."66
Notwithstanding those considerations, however, the court held that the
Rule's plain text is "based solely on the number of victims."6 7 Application

of the Special Rule should therefore be reserved for cases where there is
"any doubt as to the number of victims involved in the offense."68 This
would prevent "erroneous and contrary results when the number of
victims is readily determined."69
B. Offenses Involving Drugs and Narco-Terrorism
The Eleventh Circuit also handed down some important cases
interpreting and applying the provisions of Chapter Two, Part D of the
Guidelines, 70 which cover offenses involving drugs and narco-terrorism. 1
In particular, the court tackled issues regarding how to properly
calculate the drug quantity involved in an offense and enhancements for
defendants who have maintained a premises for drug distribution or
manufacturing. 72
1. Calculating the Drug Quantity
The "Drug Quantity Table" under USSG § 2D1.1(c)

73

is used to

calculate a defendant's total offense level, which is a product of the type
and quantity of the drugs involved in an offense. 74 As might be expected,
calculating the drug quantity correctly is crucial and can make a
difference of several years of a defendant's sentence.
The Guidelines specify that "drug quantity" refers to "the entire
weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1245-46.

70.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2D

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

71. Id.
72. See generally Griffith v. United States, 871 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2017).
73.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

2016).
74. Id.

§

2D1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
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controlled substance." 75 The application notes provide, however, that a
"mixture or substance does not include materials that must be separated
from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be
77
used."7 6 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Griffith v. United States
therefore focused on whether the toxic waste that is a byproduct of
methamphetamine manufacturing can be counted as part of such a
"mixture or substance."78
In Griffith, the court held that this unusable byproduct could not be
factored into the total drug quantity under the Eleventh Circuit's
"marketable" or "usable" approach to determining the weight of a
"mixture or substance."79 Under this approach, courts consider the
"entire weight of drug mixtures which are usable in the chain of
distribution."8 0
The court recounted prior Eleventh Circuit opinions developing the
"market-oriented approach" first set forth in Chapman v. United States,8 1
a landmark Supreme Court of the United States opinion holding that the
blotter paper used as a vehicle for consuming LSD is part of the "mixture
or substance" weighed towards the total drug quantity. 82 In United States
v. Newsome, 83 for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that the "projected
yield" from unrefined meth oil could be included towards an offense's
84
total drug quantity, even though it was consumable in its current form.
While the "precursor chemicals" to meth manufacturing can be
included in the "mixture or substance," however, the post-manufacturing
waste in Griffith could not, as it was unusable and unmarketable. 85
Consequently, the court in Griffith held it was error to count the toxic
waste towards the defendant's total drug quantity.86

75.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016).
76.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, cmt. n.1 (U.S.

COMM'N 2016).
77. 871 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2017).
78. Id. at 1327-28.
79. Id. at 1335.
80. Id.
81. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
82. Griffith, 871 F.3d at 1331.
83. 998 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1993).
84. Griffith, 871 F.3d at 1333.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1336.

SENTENCING
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2. Maintaining a Premises
In 2017, the Eleventh Circuit also clarified how to properly apply
7
the enhancement for "maintaining a premises" for the
purpose of drug distribution or manufacturing.88 This enhancement is
merited only if the government can prove two things: that the defendant
"maintained" the premises and that the premises was primarily or
principally used for drug activity.8 9 In making the latter determination,
courts are instructed to consider, among other factors, "how frequently
the premises was used by the defendant for manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance and how frequently the premises was
used by the defendant for lawful purposes."90

§ 2D1.1(b)(12),8

In United States v. George,91 the Eleventh Circuit formally adopted the

"totality of the circumstances" test that its sister circuits have applied
when determining whether a defendant's premises was maintained for
the "primary or principal" purpose of distributing or manufacturing
drugs, citing cases from those circuits illustrating the type of evidence
justifying enhancement. 92 In George, the district court enhanced the
defendant's offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(12) after finding he
maintained two premises for drug distribution: a salon he ran and his
apartment. Regarding the salon, the evidence showed that drugs, heat
sealing machines, and packaging supplies for drug distribution were kept
in the back of the building and that the salon was essentially a front
through which the defendant and his workers sold drugs. The defendant
had also admitted to making money "at the salon" through selling
drugs.93
And even though the apartment in question was the defendant's
primary residence, the court found there was sufficient evidence that the
apartment was also primarily used for drug distribution, including the
storage of drugs, drug transactions occurring within the apartment,
packaging equipment, and firearms.9 4 "[A] premises can have more than
one primary use," the court reasoned, as long as manufacturing or

§

2D1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

87.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

88.

See id.

89.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(12), cmt. n.17 (U.S. SENTENCING

COMM'N 2016).
90. Id.
91. 872 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2017).
92. Id. at 1205-07.
93. Id. at 1206.
94. Id.
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distributing drugs is more than an "incidental or collateral" use of the
premises. 95
C. Enhancementsfor Child Pornography,Enticement, and Sex

Trafficking Offenses
Several of the cases that came before the Eleventh Circuit in 2017
involved competing interpretations of the enhancements found under
Chapter Two, Part G of the Guidelines,9 6 whose provisions govern sexual
offenses like the sexual abuse and exploitation of minors and sex
trafficking crimes.9 7 Specifically, the court focused on the enhancements
applicable to offenders whose offense involved "sadist or masochistic"
conduct, who engaged in a pattern of sexual abuse of minors, or who
exercised undue influence on minors to induce them to engage in sexual
acts.9 8
1. Enhancements for Offenses
Involving Sadistic or
Masochistic Conduct
In United States v. Scheels,9 9 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted an
enhancement under USSG § 2G2.1,100 the Guideline for child
pornography offenses. 101 USSG § 2G2.1(b)(4) increases an offender's base
offense level by four levels if "the offense involved material that
portrays . . . sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of
violence."1 02
While the defendant conceded that the whipping and bondage in the
pornographic video he produced constituted "sadistic or masochistic
conduct," he argued that the enhancement shouldn't apply because
§ 2G2.1(b)(4) only applies to conduct directed towards a minor.
Accordingly, he argued his offense level should not be enhanced since the
whipping and bondage in the video was directed towards him, not the
child victim. 1 03

In a per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's
interpretation of § 2G2.1(b)(4), citing instead the provision's "plain

95. Id.
96. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2G (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

97. Id.
98. See generally United States v. Scheels, 846 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2017).
99. 846 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2017).
100.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2G2.1

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

101. Scheels, 846 F.3d at 1341-42.
102.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

2016).
103. Scheels, 846 F.3d at 1342.

§

2G2.1(b)(4) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2018]
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language."1 04 The court explained that the word "involved" lends itself to
a broader, more inclusive definition, and even if the conduct was not
directed at the victim, the child was "involved" by virtue of participating
in a video that depicted sadistic or masochistic conduct. 105
2. Enhancements for Patterns of Activity Involving Sexual
Abuse or Exploitation of Minors
USSG § 2G2.2, 06 meanwhile, applies to crimes of trafficking in
materials involving sexual exploitation of minors.1 07 In United States v.
Alberts, 0 8 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an enhancement to the
defendant's offense level under § 2G2.2(b)(5), which triggers a five-level
increase "if the defendant has ever 'engaged in a pattern of activity
09
involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor."'
The district court found there was sufficient evidence of the requisite
"pattern of activity" in the defendant's admissions that he engaged in
sexual acts with his younger relatives thirty years prior, when they were
under twelve years old and he was sixteen. The defendant appealed,
arguing that he was a minor at the time he engaged in those sexual acts
0
and that § 2G2.2(b)(5) does not apply to "minor-on-minor conduct.""1
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's proposed interpretation
of § 2G2.2(b)(5), citing persuasive decisions by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit,"' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit,11 2 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit" 3 affirming enhancements based on a defendant's
"juvenile conduct against other minors."11 4 In particular, the court
adopted and restated the reasoning from the Second Circuit's holding in
5
United States v. Reingold.11
As the Second Circuit did in Reingold, the Eleventh Circuit stated two
reasons for applying § 2G2.2(b)(5) to sexual acts a defendant commits as

104. Id. at 1342-43.
105. Id. at 1342.
106. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
107. Id.
108. 859 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2017).
109. Id. at 983 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(5) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).
110. Id. at 981-83.
111. United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013).
112. United States v. 01fano, 503 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2007).
113. United States v. Woodard, 694 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2012).
114. Alberts, 859 F.3d at 983.
115. Id. at 984.
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a minor.116 First, the application notes to § 2G2.2(b)(5) define "sexual
abuse or exploitation" by reference to statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 2241,117
which criminalizes sexual abuse of minors under twelve years old and
applies to minors and adults alike. 118 Since "minors can be prosecuted
under § 2241, that means acts committed by a defendant when he was a
minor can in turn support a § 2G2.2(b)(5) enhancement later on."" 9
Second, the Eleventh Circuit echoed the Second Circuit's observation in
Reingold that other Guidelines enhancements explicitly exclude from
consideration acts that an offender commits as a minor-an exception not
present in the text of § 2G2.2(b)(5).120
While the court in Alberts held that "[n]othing in § 2G2.2(b)(5) limits
its application to adult conduct," the court also stressed the limitations
of this holding. 121 Only minor-on-minor conduct specifically falling within
one of the definitions of "sexual abuse or exploitation" articulated by
statutes referenced in § 2G2.2(b)(5)'s application notes can trigger the
enhancement. 122 Accordingly, sexual conduct between minors that does
not fall under one of those statutory definitions is insufficient to justify
an enhancement.
3. Unduly Influencing a Minor to Engage in Prohibited Sexual
Conduct and Double Counting
In United States v. Blake, 123 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
defendant's sentence after interpreting two enhancements under
§ 2G1.3,124 which governs commercial sex trafficking of minors and other
sex offenses involving minors.1 25 The defendant in Blake was convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591126 for running a prostitution ring featuring
minors. 127
First, the court reviewed the district court's decision to enhance the
defendant's offense level pursuant to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), which applies to
offenders who have "unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2018)
Alberts, 859 F.3d at 984.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
868 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2017).

124.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

125. Id.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018).
127. Blake, 868 F.3d at 967.
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sexual conduct." 128 The defendant argued that the enhancement did not
apply, since the minor victims "sought him out," and if anything, "they
influenced him."1 29
The court rejected the defendant's argument, reciting the application
notes to USSG § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), which establish a "rebuttable
presumption" of undue influence, irrespective of who initiates the
offensive conduct, if a defendant is ten years older than the victimS. 130

The defendant in Blake failed to overcome this presumption, and the
court credited evidence that he "abused his superior knowledge and
resources" in managing the prostitution in which the minors
participated, marketing them as prostitutes online, and using his car to
transport them to customers. 131
Second, the defendant in Blake objected to the district court enhancing
his offense level under § 2G1.3(b)(4), which increases a defendant's
offense level by two levels if "the offense 'involved the commission of a
sex act or sexual contact."' 132 The defendant argued that applying this
enhancement would amount to impermissible "double counting" because
the "commission of a sex act" was already an element of the underlying
statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591.13

In response, the court pointed to its recent decision in United States v.
Mozie, 134 where it held that the elements to a violation under § 1591
require placing a victim "in a position where a sex act could occur,
regardless of whether a sex act eventually did occur."135 Conversely,
§ 2G1.3(b)(4) "reaches only offenses where a sex act or sexual conduct
actually did occur," thus addressing a different harm.13 6 Application of
the enhancement did not constitute double counting, as the defendant
was convicted under a statute that only required the potential for a sex
act, while his sentence was enhanced for the actual commission of one. 13 7

128. Id. at 976-77 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2GL2(b)(2)(B)
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).
129. Id. at 977.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.3(b)(4) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
752 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2014).
Blake, 868 F.3d at 977.
Id. at 977-78.

Id.
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D. Offenses Involving Public Safety
The Eleventh Circuit decided a handful of cases in 2017 interpreting
several provisions under Chapter 2, Part K, 38 which address firearm
offenses.139 The court's most important decisions dealt with USSG
§ 2K2.1, which covers offenses involving the unlawful possession or
transportation of firearms and ammunition. 140 Under this Guideline, a
defendant's offense level is calculated based on several factors, including
the number of firearms involved, the nature of the offense, and notably,
the defendant's prior criminal history.1 41
1. Enhancements for Prior Convictions for Crimes of Violence
or Controlled Substance Offenses
Calculating a defendant's offense level under USSG § 2K2.1(a) often
requires determining a defendant's prior criminal history, as a
defendant's base offense level depends on whether he has one or more
prior convictions for a "crime of violence" or "controlled substance
offense."1 42 Since over half of defendants convicted for unlawful
possession of a firearm have a criminal history category of III or
higher,1 43 a defendant's criminal history is crucial to establishing the
correct sentencing range. USSG § 2K2.1 defines "crimes of violence" and
"controlled substance offenses" by reference to their definitions under
USSG § 4B1.2(a) and (b),144 respectively. 145 Consequently, many
Eleventh Circuit decisions interpreting § 2K2.1 necessarily involve
interpreting § 411.2.
In United States v. Martin,146 for example, the court addressed the
definition of "crime of violence" under § 411.2 for a defendant whose
sentence was calculated under § 2K2.1.147 There, the district court

138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2K (U.S.

139. Id.
140. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2K2.1

141.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

2K2.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016) (establishing a defendant's base offense level based on these factors).
142. Id. Under § 2K2.1(a)(2), for example, a base offense level of 24 is applied when a
defendant has "at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense." Id.
143.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A

FIREARM (2016).
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
2016).
145.

§§ 4B1.2(a)(b)

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

COMM'N 2016).
146. 864 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2017).
147. Id. at 1282-83.

§

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2K2.1, cmt. n.1 (U.S.

SENTENCING
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calculated the defendant's offense level after determining that his prior
Florida conviction for "felony fleeing to elude" was a conviction for a
"crime of violence," a finding based on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
United States v. Petite,148 which held that a Florida conviction under the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)149 for "felony
fleeing to elude" qualifies as a "violent felony."1 50 Because the definition
of "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2 mirrors the definition of "violent
felony" under the ACCA, the court reasoned, "it follows that an offense
that is a violent felony under the ACCA is a crime of violence under
§ 2K2.1."151 The defendant objected, however, based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Johnson v. United States,152 which struck down the
"residual clause" of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague.15 s
Unpersuaded, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant's sentence,
holding that the defendant's argument was foreclosed by the Supreme
Court in Beckles v. United States,154 where the Court held that the
Sentencing Guidelines are immune from vagueness challenges.155 Even
though the Sentencing Commission had recently amended the
Guidelines to remove the "residual clause" from the Guidelines' definition
of "crime of violence," the amendment was neither effective at the time of
the defendant's sentencing nor retroactive.156
The Eleventh Circuit caseload in 2017 also included an important case
grappling with the definition of "controlled substance offense" under
§ 2K2.1 and § 411.2. In United States v. Lange,15 7 the court set out to
determine whether a Florida conviction for "principal to attempted
manufacture of a controlled substance" qualified as a predicate prior
conviction for increasing the defendant's offense level pursuant to
§ 2K2.1(a)(4).158
The court noted that the Eleventh Circuit employs the "categorical
approach" when determining whether a state law conviction constitutes
a "controlled substance offense" under § 4B1.2, meaning courts compare
the Guidelines' definition of "controlled substance offense" to the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

703 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013).
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2018).
Martin, 864 F.3d at 1282.
Id. at 1282-83.
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
Martin, 864 F.3d at 1283.
137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
Martin, 864 F.3d at 1283.
Id.
862 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1292-93.
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substantive elements of the state crime of conviction.15 9 The Guidelines
define a "controlled substance offense" as any felony under federal or
state law "that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution,
or dispensing of a controlled substance," 160 and the commentary expands
this definition to "include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring,
and attempting to commit such offenses." 161
The defendant argued that the district court erred in considering his
prior conviction a "controlled substance offense," because the elements of
the Florida crime for principal liability did not require aiding and
abetting a completed offense or attempting an offense, but merely aiding
and abetting an attempt. In fact, the defendant wasn't even explicitly
convicted of a controlled substance offense, but rather under a general
law imposing principal liability for aiding and abetting any attempted
crime. 162 The defendant argued that the Guidelines should be read
narrowly to exclude such a broad state law from constituting a "controlled
substance offense" under § 4B1.2(b).163
The court disagreed, holding that the Guidelines' "definition of a
'controlled substance offense,' as informed by Application Note 1, is broad
enough to encompass liability as a principal in the first degree under
Florida law." 164 The court declared that the commentary to the

Guidelines' definition, which "includes the offenses of aiding and
abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit" controlled substances
offenses "is not exhaustive."165 Instead, the plain language of § 411.2
includes any state law crime that "'prohibits' certain activities related to
controlled substances."1 6 6 Ultimately, the court held that the Florida law
under which the defendant was convicted prohibited manufacturing a
controlled substance and required an intent to further the commission of

that crime.16 7
2. Enhancements Based on the Number of Firearms
Under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B), a defendant receives a four-level increase to
his offense level if his offense for unlawful possession of a firearm
159.
160.

Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1294 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.2(a)(b), cmt. n.1

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 777.011 (2017)).
Id.
Id.

165. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).

166.
167.

Id. at 1295 (quoting United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014)).
Id. at 1295-96.
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involved eight to twenty-four firearms, 16 8 though the commentary notes
that "only those firearms that were unlawfully sought to be obtained,
unlawfully possessed, or unlawfully distributed"1 69 should count towards
the enhancement.170
In United States v. Gill,171 the court interpreted the meaning of
"unlawfully" as it pertains to the guns that may be counted under
§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(B).172 In Gill, the defendant conceded that seven of the
firearms he possessed were unlawful. However, he maintained that
possession of the eighth was not illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),1 73 as the
government could not prove the firearm's "nexus with interstate or
foreign commerce."174 On appeal, the court acknowledged that possession
of the gun in question may not violate § 922(g), but held that "application
[of] note 5 to § 2K2.1 requires only that [the defendant's] possession of
each pistol be 'unlawful,' not that it be unlawful under federal law." 7 5 In
Gill, the defendant's possession of the eighth firearm was undisputedly
illegal under state law.176 The court concluded that possessing firearms
illegally under state law is sufficient to trigger § 2K2.1(b)(1) "for
sentencing purposes." 7 7
III. CHAPTER

THREE ENHANCEMENTS

A. Aggravating and MitigatingRole Adjustments
Chapter Three, Part B178 lists several enhancements to a defendant's
offense level depending on their role in the offense. USSG § 3B1.2, for
example, allows for two or four-level decrease to the defendant's offense
level if the defendant was a "minor" or "minimal" participant in the

168.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016).
169. Id.
170. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2K2.1(b), cmt. n.5 (U.S. SENTENCING

COMM'N 2016).
171. 864 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2017).
172. Id. at 1280.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018).
174. Gill, 864 F.3d at 1280.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 3B

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
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offense conduct.17 9 In United States v. Monzo,180 the Eleventh Circuit
reminded us that courts rarely grant these, upholding a district court's
decision to deny the defendant a minor-role reduction based on the
defendant's status as a low-level courier of controlled substances. 8 1
More common are increases under USSG § 3B1.1 for defendants who
play an "aggravated role" in their offense, such as that of a leader,
organizer, manager, or supervisor. 182 In United States v. Bergman,18 3 the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed a district court's application of § 3B1.1(b),
which increases a defendant's offense level by three if the defendant "was
a manager or supervisor" (but not an organizer or leader) in an offense
"involv[ing] five or more participants."1 84 The district court found
sufficient evidence of the defendant's role in his recruitment of patientparticipants for the fraudulent billing offense.1 85
The defendant, convicted for paying and receiving bribes and
kickbacks in a healthcare fraud scheme, objected to the enhancement on
the grounds that he had already received an enhancement for involving
vulnerable patient-victims in his offense, and "patients cannot be both
victims and co-conspirators whom he managed." 8 6 The court disagreed,
holding that "[t]he manager or supervisor and the vulnerable victim
increases are not mutually exclusive. There is nothing contradictory
about finding that Santaya managed some patients participating in the
illegal scheme, while taking advantage of other vulnerable victims."1 87 As

long as there were some patients who were neglected or otherwise
suffered from misallocation of healthcare resources and the defendant
instructed them and other patients "by coaching them on lying about
their symptoms," the court ruled that both enhancements could apply.' 8 8
B. Victim-Based Adjustments
In addition to Bergman, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed two other cases
involving victim-based enhancements under Chapter Three, Part A. In
179. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.2(a)-(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2016) The rule also offers offenders who are between "minor" and "minimal" participants
receive a three-level decrease. Id.
180. 852 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2017).
181. Id. at 1346-47 (reasoning there is no presumption that low-level couriers are
entitled to minor-role reduction under § 3B1.2(b)).
182. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
183. 852 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 2017).
184. Id. at 1072.
185. Id. at 1060-61.
186. Id. at 1071-72.
187. Id. at 1072.
188. Id.
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United States v. Mathews,189 a defendant was convicted for intentionally
damaging a computer belonging to the Department of Veterans' Affairs,
thereby interfering with a patient's medical care, and knowingly altering
or falsifying data stored on the Department's computer system with the
intent to obstruct justice.19o

The defendant appealed an enhancement to his offense level under

§ 3A1.1(b), which provides for a two-level increase when a defendant
knew or should have known that a victim of his offense was vulnerable,
whether due to age, condition, or other susceptibility to the criminal
conduct. 19 ' Among other things, the defendant argued that the United
States was the only "victim" of his offense, as the patient in question, who
ultimately died, was a victim of the defendant's negligence in failing to
provide medical care and not the criminal actions he took to cover up that
negligence.192

The Eleventh Circuit upheld application of the enhancement against
these arguments.1 93 The court held that the mere potential for harm
created by the defendant's actions to cover up his negligence was
sufficient to merit enhancement for involving a vulnerable victim, even
if the cover-up did not actually have a negative impact on the patient's
care. 194 Alternatively, the court reasoned, the defendant's gross
negligence itself could be grounds for enhancement, even though it
occurred two hours prior to the defendant's crime, as it was "relevant
conduct that is inextricably intertwined with the offense conduct" and
"caused the need to falsify the medical records in the first place." 9 5 The
court acknowledged that this was not a "narrow" reading of the
enhancement.1 96
Additionally, in United States v. Tejas,197 where the defendant
forcefully took a piece of mail from a U.S. mail courier, the court affirmed
application of a three-level enhancement under § 3A1.2(a), which applies
when an offense is motivated by the victim's status as a government
officer or employee. 98 The defendant objected, arguing that he "was not

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

874 F.3d 698 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 702.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707-08.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
868 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2017).
Tejas, 868 F.3d at 1247.
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motivated by the status of the mail carrier and that the enhancement is
reserved for cases of assault"1 99
On appeal, the court rejected the defendant's narrow reading of
§ 3A1.2(a). 200 The court cited precedent where the enhancement was
applied to a defendant who robbed a postal employee of money orders,
but no personal belongings. 201 Like the victim in that case, the victim in
Tejas was targeted because the defendant knew and was motivated by
the fact that, as a U.S. postal employee, the victim had the mail in her
possession that he intended to take. 202
C. Acceptance of Responsibility Under USSG § 3E1.1
USSG § 3E1.1203 instructs courts to reduce a defendant's offense level
by two levels if he "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for
his offense." 204 In 2017, the Eleventh Circuit laid down two decisions
illustrating the broad authority courts have in granting or denying this
reduction. 205
In United States v. Mathews, the court reviewed a district court's
decision to deny the defendant a three-level reduction for accepting
responsibility for his actions. 206 As the application notes to § 3E1.1 state,
pleading guilty and admitting to a criminal offense provides "significant
evidence of acceptance of responsibility . . . However, this evidence may
be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such
acceptance of responsibility." 207 The district court denied the defendant a
reduction because the defendant failed a drug test, which the court took
to mean "that it lacked any authority to grant the acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction." 208
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendant's sentence, however,
precisely because the district court did have this authority, despite the
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Id. at 1246.

203.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

204.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

§

3E1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016). Subsection (b) provides for a decrease by an additional level if the offense level is
level 16 or greater and the government files a motion stating that the defendant's assistance
avoiding trial or wasting resources. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

205. See generally Mathews, 874 F.3d at 698; Wright, 862 F.3d at 1265.
206. Mathews, 874 F.3d at 710.
207.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

COMM'N 2016).
208. Mathews, 874 F.3d at 703.

§

3E1.1, cmt. n.3 (U.S. SENTENCING
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defendant's failed drug test. 209 The court noted that the commentary to
§ 3E1.1 lists "a number of non-exhaustive factors that a district court
may consider" in granting a reduction, but not "any conduct that would
automatically preclude" granting one. 210 So, while the defendant's failed
drug test might be sufficient to warrant denying him a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, district courts still must recognize and
exercise their authority to consider drug tests and other "factual
circumstances" before making that determination. 211
Indeed, months earlier, the Eleventh Circuit had reminded us in
Wright that a failed drug test in violation of a defendant's bond conditions
was sufficient to deny a reduction, even if the drug use was "unrelated to
the offense of conviction." 21 2
IV. PROPERLY COUNTING A DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS

A defendant's Guidelines range for imprisonment is a product of his
total offense level and his criminal history category. Defendants are
assigned to a criminal history category based on their prior criminal
history. 213 Specifically, under USSG § 4A1.1, 214 district courts look at any
"prior sentences" imposed on a defendant and add "criminal history
points" based on the length of imprisonment in those prior sentences. 215
The total number of criminal history points assigned to the defendant
then determines which category in Chapter Five, Part A216 he will be
placed in.217.
Ascertaining a defendant's criminal history is a complicated task, as it
often depends on tracking down state court records and distinguishing
sentences of imprisonment from alternative types of sentences. 218 These
difficulties are reflected in the Eleventh Circuit's 2017 cases interpreting

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 709.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Wright, 862 F.3d at 1279.

213.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4A1. 1

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

214. Id.
215. Id. Subsection (a), for example, adds three points for each prior sentence "exceeding
one year and one month." Id.
216.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5A

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

217. Id. Chapter Five, Part A includes the sentencing table, which establishes ranges
based on a defendant's criminal history category and offense level. Id.
218. See generally Wright, 862 F.3d at 1265; United States v. Baptiste, 876 F.3d 1057
(11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Monzo, 852 F3d 1342; United States v. Burke, 863 F.3d
1355 (11th Cir. 2017).
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Chapter Four of the Guidelines, titled "Criminal History and Criminal
Livelihood." 219

1. Calculating a Defendant's Total Criminal History Points
under § 4A1.1
In United States v. Wright, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a district
court's calculation of a defendant's criminal history score based on his
five prior convictions; three for driving on a suspended license and two
for misdemeanor marijuana possession.220 The defendant challenged the
district court's findings and her subsequent placement in criminal
history category 111.221
First, the defendant challenged the district court's conclusion that her
two prior convictions for marijuana possession constituted two "prior
sentences" under § 4A1.1(c). 222 The defendant argued that her sentence
from a 2015 conviction should not be counted towards her criminal
history score, as the court had withheld adjudication after she pled nolo
contendere.223 She argued that this sentence constituted a diversionary
disposition under USSG § 4A1.2(f), 2 24 which provides that,
[d]iversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g.,
deferred prosecution) is not counted. A diversionary disposition
resulting from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo
contendere, in a judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence under
225
§4A1.1(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered.
In response, the court cited Eleventh Circuit precedent clearly stating
that a "diversionary disposition resulting from . . . a plea of nolo

contendere," even without an adjudication of guilt, counts as a "prior
sentence." 226 Since the defendant had pled nolo contendere, that sentence
counted. 227 Nonetheless, the court vacated the defendant's sentence
because the district court had not made a finding as to whether the
defendant's 2013 charge for possession of marijuana resulted in a plea or

219. See generally id.
220. Wright, 862 F.3d at 1271.
221. Id. at 1273.
222. Id. at 1280.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2016).
226. Wright, 862 F.3d at 1280 (quoting United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1522
(11th Cir. 1996)).
227. Id.
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adjudication of guilt, or whether it was a "diversionary disposition"
without such a plea or adjudication. 228
The more important issue in Wright, however, was whether the
defendant's three convictions for driving with a suspended license
produced three separate "prior sentences" even though "she served only
one sentence for all three citations." 229 The court held that they did not,
citing § 4A1.2(a)(2), which specifies that sentences are "counted
separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated
by an intervening arrest." 230
Though the defendant was sentenced for all three driving offenses on
the same date, the question was whether there were intervening arrests
between any of the three offenses. 231 Since she was only arrested after
the second and third citations, only those could convictions could count
as "prior sentences." 232 The first and second driving violations, however,
were only separated by the defendant receiving a citation. 233
Noting that the Eleventh Circuit had never decided whether a citation
could qualify as an arrest, the court formally held that a "traffic citation
for driving with a suspended license is not an arrest under
§ 4A1.2(a)(2)." 234 For support, the court cited the "ordinary meaning" of
the word "arrest," which rests on someone being "seized and taken into
custody, however briefly," and the fact that arrests include a series of
procedural steps. 235
In another case, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the definition of "prior
sentence of imprisonment" under § 4A1.1. In United States v. Baptiste,236
the court determined that a defendant's prior sentence of "198 days time
served" after an unadjudicated guilty plea to marijuana possession
constituted a "prior sentence" under § 4A1.1(c) but not a "prior sentence
of imprisonment" under § 4A1.1(b).237 Accordingly, the defendant's prior
sentence was worth only one criminal history point, not two. 238 Crucial to
the court's holding was that sentences defined under § 4A1.2(f), the
exception to the general rule that unadjudicated charges do not
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1273.
230. Id. at 1281 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(a)(2) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id. at 1282.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1282-83.
876 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1061-62.
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constitute prior sentences, only count under § 4A1.1(c). 239 Conversely,
prior sentences of imprisonment under § 4A1.1(a) or (b) only count if
240
there was an adjudication of guilt.
As opposed to the type of sentence imposed, United States v. Monzo
involved the length and timing of a prior sentence as counted towards a
defendant's criminal history score. There, the defendant had a prior
conviction for felony drug-possession under Nevada law and had received
241
The
a sentence of two years of probation, which was later revoked.
court held that, though suspended sentences of imprisonment are
generally not counted as prior sentences, the Guidelines specify that
when probation is revoked, courts "add the original term of imprisonment
242
to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation."
After the defendant's probation was revoked, he was sentenced to
twelve to thirty months of imprisonment, of which the defendant claimed
he served less than thirteen months. On appeal, he argued that the
district court erred in considering this sentence a "prior sentence of
243
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month."
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however, holding that regardless of
how much time the defendant served, the sentence nevertheless qualified
as a "prior sentence" exceeding one year and one month because the
Guidelines are based on the sentence "imposed" and not on "time actually
served." 2 4 4 And because the "sentence imposed" is the maximum sentence
provided for in a given range, the defendant's "prior sentence" was thirty
245
months.
Finally, but importantly, the Eleventh Circuit decided another case
involving the timing of "prior sentences" being considered in a
defendant's criminal history. In United States v. Burke,246 the court asked
whether "a state sentence imposed after a defendant's initial federal
sentence but before the district court vacated that sentence and
247
resentenced him" qualifies as a "prior sentence" under § 4A1.1(a).
Recognizing a circuit split on this question, the Eleventh Circuit held

239. Id. at 1062 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016) ("A diversionary disposition . .. is counted as a sentence under
§ 4A1.1(c))).
240. Id.
241. Monzo, 852 F3d at 1349.
242. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(k)(1) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 1348-49.

Id.
Id. at 1350.
863 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1356-57.
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that such an intervening sentence does qualify as a prior sentence as "it
is the sequence of sentences not the sequence of crimes that matters," and
248
because "a vacated sentence is void and resentencing occurs de novo."
2. Enhancements for Career Offenders under § 4B1.1
Under Chapter Four, Part B,249 a defendant convicted of a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense is labeled a "career offender" if
he "has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence
or a controlled substance offense." 250 Based on the maximum sentence
applicable to the defendant's offense, designation as a "career offender"
increases a defendant's offense level and automatically establishes a
25
criminal history category of VI. 1

The career-offender enhancement has been criticized as overly harsh.
In 2016, application of the enhancement increased the original
Guidelines' range for 91.9% of the defendants to whom it was applied,
58.8% of who "would have had a Criminal History Category lower than
252
The Commission
VI if the career-offender provision had not applied."

also published a Report to Congress in 2016 recommending that the
Career-Offender Guideline be amended, as it, the Commission found,
overinflates defendants' criminal histories, especially those convicted of
253
non-violent drug offenses.
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit continued upholding the
254
enhancement's application in 2017. In United States v. Pridgeon, for
example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a defendant's argument that a
prior state drug conviction which did not require proving a mens rea
element could not be considered as a predicate conviction under

§

2
411.2. 55

V. CONCLUSION

A look at the Eleventh Circuit's caseload in 2017 makes it clear that
the Guidelines, while advisory, still hold an important place in the

248. Id. at 1359-60.
249.
250.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016).
251.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(b) (U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N

2016).
252. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, QUICK FACTS: CAREER OFFENDER (2017).
253. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONG.: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS (Aug. 2016).

254. 853 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2017).
255. Id. at 1197-98 (reaffirming United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014)).
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hierarchy of sentencing law. As the Eleventh Circuit and other courts
continue developing the Guidelines, it is important for lawyers and
judges to keep up with those changes. As the U.S. Senate ushers in a new
class of judges to take the bench, it will be interesting to see whether the
law of sentencing is in for a makeover.

